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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHRISTA C. SCHAUMBERG, 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Case NO. 920865-CA 
THOMAS J. SCHAUMBERG, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Defendant/Appellant, Thomas J. Schaumberg, respectfully 
files the following Brief in Reply to the Brief filed by Appellee 
in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT RELIEVED FROM ITS 
RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE FINDINGS REGARDING 
MRS. SCHAUMBERG'S NEEDS IN THIS CASE. 
Appellee acknowledges that the Court must make findings 
regarding the financial condition and needs of the recipient 
spouse, as well as her ability to produce income. Then she 
suggests that the requirement should be waived in this case 
because the facts support only a finding in favor of the $800.00 
award. In so doing, Mrs. Schaumberg ignores the inconsistencies 
in her own testimony, and the testimony elicited on cross-
examination which does not support the award of alimony and 
certainly draws into question just what her needs are. 
In so doing, Mrs. Schaumberg suggests that it is not 
necessary for the Court to make a finding regarding her needs in 
awarding her alimony. The award, in and of itself, should be 
sufficient to suggest that her needs require that sum of monthly 
support. If that were the case, then it would never be a 
requirement to make a separate finding regarding the recipient 
spouse's needs. Simply the award would be enough. 
However, the requirement of specific, understandable, and 
defensible findings is necessary so that the appellate courts can 
review: (1) the appropriateness of the award, and (2) whether it 
is supported by the evidence. 
For instance, in this case, Plaintiff ignores the fact that 
her estimate of housing and housing related expenses was based 
upon her experience in living in the large family home which had 
been sold by the time of the trial. (Transcript pages 4 3 - 44) 
Furthermore, Plaintiff had done no investigation into what her 
expenses would be following the sale of the home for items such 
as utilities, insurance and the like. (Transcript pages 43-44) 
The marital home was a five bedroom home with a complete basement 
which was clearly exceeded the needs of the wife. (Transcript 
page 44) 
Mrs. Schaumberg7s suggestion that she was not familiar with 
the household expenses during the course of the litigation in 
this case is unbelievable. She maintained the household finances 
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and paid the bills up until shortly before the separation of the 
parties. (Transcript page 46, line 15) 
The Plaintiff's estimate of medical expenses are not medical 
expenses at all, rather anticipated expenses for medical 
insurance assuming that she is not working and not covered by 
work related health insurance.1 The Plaintiff testified, 
regarding the availability of medical insurance through 
employment, Answer: "No. I get work, and I have medical 
benefits, yes, but if I don't, I have to use health insurance." 
(Transcript page 44, lines 8-9) 
The Plaintiff could not adequately explain the increase 
between her pre-trial declaration of expenses and those that she 
relied upon at trial. (Transcript page 49) The Plaintiff 
testified that she required $160.00 per month for school when she 
was not enrolled in school. Subsequently, she did enroll, but 
was taking only one class. 
In fact, throughout these proceedings, the Plaintiff has 
testified variously about her living expenses with a differential 
of over $900.00 per month. Mrs. Schaumberg suggests now that her 
trial testimony is all the more credible because the figure at 
trial was $900.00 less than what she testified to at times during 
the pendency of the case. In fact, this is one of the principal 
In fact, the Plaintiff had been working during the pendency of the 
case, substantially throughout the marriage, is able bodied, and was under-
employed hence the court's imputation of full-time income to the Plaintiff. 
The imputed income was based upon the testimony of the Defendant's expert 
employment consultant. (Transcript pages 64-78) 
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reasons that the Court should make findings in this case 
regarding her needs. Her testimony is not credible. Her trial 
testimony was no more reliable than her, albeit more inflated 
estimates made at other times in the case. 
The fact that the Plaintiff "did not realize how expensive 
life was" (Plaintiff's Brief, page 7, and Transcript page 53, 
line 14), would seem to suggest that her testimony at trial would 
reflect a higher level of need, not less. This was not the case. 
The Plaintiff's reliance on Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 
841 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) is misplaced. That case does not 
justify an absent finding as to wife's needs as she suggests in 
this case. Rather, that case was remanded because the findings 
were inadequate. There it was required that the Court do more 
than simply state that "The [husband] has the ability to pay." 
Similarly, in this case the Court must do more than simply state 
that the wife needs a particular sum for alimony. This is 
especially so where her own testimony is unreliable on its fact. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD CONSIDER ALL SOURCES 
OF INCOME AVAILABLE TO THE RECIPIENT SPOUSE 
WHEN AWARDING ALIMONY. 
The Plaintiff argues that the Court need not consider all of 
her sources of income because this case warrants income 
equalization. First of all, the Court did not make that finding. 
Secondly, income equalization does not relieve the Court from 
making adequate findings as to the income available to the 
receiving spouse. 
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While it may be that this is an appropriate case for 
alimony, the amount of alimony should not be determined simply by 
suggesting that all income shall be equalized. The Plaintiff 
does not fit the so called "equalization" profile as suggested. 
Typically, significant alimony or equalized income has been 
awarded in cases of thirty of more years of marriage, where the 
recipient spouse has been out of the work force for many years, 
where the recipient spouse has stayed home and raised a family, 
where the recipient spouse is minimally trained and not likely to 
obtain significant employment. (See Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072 (Utah 1985) [permanent alimony awarded to unskilled 
housewife in her mid-50's who possesses few marketable job skills 
and who has little hope of retraining after 29 years of 
marriage]; Anderson v. Anderson, 757, P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) [34 year marriage involving housewife spouse who has no 
outside work skills]; Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 978 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) [27 year marriage with spouse who now is working only part-
time and who had a disabled minor child]; Howell v. Howell, 806 
P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) [receiving spouse was 
approximately 50 years old, had minimal marketable job skills, 
had spent most of the 3 0 plus years of the parties' marriage 
raising and caring for their five children in the home]; Rasband 
v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) [involving a 30 
year marriage where the recipient spouse had no income and was 
caring for an adult disabled child]). 
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Clearly, the Jones/Rasband/Howell profile relates more to 
the duration of alimony than to any perceived "equalization" 
mandate. Furthermore, the Plaintiff here does not fit the 
profile. She is educated, was employed for substantial periods 
throughout the marriage, and is employable at significant 
earnings (albeit less than the Defendant's) at the time of trial. 
In such a case, the principal and standard set down in Thronson 
v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991) would appear more 
equitable. In that case, even through the paying spouse had 
income of more than three times the receiving spouse, the Court 
did not suggest equalization of the incomes. The principal is, 
simply, just because the paying spouse has more income does not 
justify in and of itself any increased payment to the receiving 
spouse absent a showing of need. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT RELIED UPON AN INAPPROPRIATE 
RATIONALE IN DETERMINING THE APPRECIATION ON 
THE HUSBAND'S OTHERWISE SEPARATE 
(INHERITANCE) PROPERTY WAS MARITAL. 
The Plaintiff suggests that the increased value in the 
Defendant's inheritance property should be part of the marital 
estate. The only basis for this is the finding that the 
Defendant's corporation paid the Defendant rent that exceeded the 
mortgage. 
Mrs. Schaumberg admits that the property is separate 
property of the Defendant. For the reasons set out in the 
Defendant's principal brief, appreciation on that property should 
also be separate property. The Plaintiff must establish, and 
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there must be facts to support the argument that the Plaintiff 
contributed to, enhanced, maintained or protected the property in 
order to make it marital and subject to the equitable 
distribution powers of the court. While the Court can distribute 
otherwise separate property within its equitable powers, the 
court in this case has chosen not to use those powers, but rather 
has based its decision on the theory that the Plaintiff has 
contributed to, enhanced maintained or protected the property. 
The Plaintiff has ignored one critical fact in analyzing 
this issue. Even though the corporation paid the Defendant rent 
that exceeded the mortgage, after paying the mortgage, utilities 
and upkeep, the Defendant experienced a "slightly negative cash 
flow.ft (emphasis added) (Transcript page 176, lines 19 - 21) 
It is logically insufficient to argue that simply because 
the corporation pays one of the parties rent, that the property 
is commingled and no longer separate. It must be shown, at 
least, that the rent payment is unreasonable, or some such 
similar fact to justify the finding of commingling. There was no 
such evidence in this case. The Defendant owns an office 
building which is admittedly separate/inheritance property. He 
rendered it to his own corporation. The payments were inadequate 
to cover the costs of operating the building. There was no net 
profit or income. It makes no difference, under those 
circumstances, whether the building was rented to his own 
corporation or some other tenant. Clearly, the Defendant's own 
corporation had to have offices and had to pay rent somewhere. 
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Under those circumstances, the same rent would be paid, absent 
evidence to the contrary, which was not introduced. Presumably, 
if the Defendant had no financial interest in the tenant, then 
where would be no argument about the separate character of the 
inheritance property. 
The Plaintiff's reliance on the Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), is misplaced. The Watson case suggested 
that assets of the corporation were nevertheless marital assets 
for the reasons set out in the Plaintiff's brief. The Defendant, 
here, does not dispute that principal. The Court properly 
exercised its equitable power to divide the corporation and its 
assets. What the Plaintiff attempts to do in this case, is not 
allowed under Watson. The Plaintiff attempts to make an asset a 
corporate asset (and therefore a marital asset), when it is not. 
In so doing, the Plaintiff attempts to turn Watson "inside out." 
The Defendant has never suggested that the inheritance property 
was separate for any reason other than the fact that it was 
inherited by the Defendant, and the Plaintiff never contributed, 
enhanced or protected it. It is separate property for that 
reason, not because the Defendant's corporation was a tenant in 
the building. 
POINT IV. 
THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO HER FEES ON 
APPEAL. 
The Plaintiff was not awarded attorney's fees at trial. She 
should not be awarded attorney's fees on appeal. See Rasband v. 
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Plaintiff's 
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attempted introduction of facts which are not in the record is 
objectionable and a flagrant attempt to prejudice the Court. If 
circumstances have come up since the trial of this matter which 
would warrant the award of fees, then, at best, that one issue 
should be remanded to the Court for further findings and 
determination. To ask this Court to entertain facts which are 
not a part of the record is unfair and inequitable. Inasmuch as 
the Plaintiff bases its claim for attorney's fees on a "drastic 
change of circumstances" which are not part of the record, those 
"changes" as relied upon by the Plaintiff should be stricken from 
her brief and ignored by the Court. 
While the Defendant will not address each of the 
allegations, it should be sufficient to point out that Plaintiff 
has failed to take the steps necessary to receive her portion of 
the military retainer pay which was awarded to her. For tax 
reasons, the Plaintiff would rather have the money paid to the 
Defendant and require him to pay over one-half thereof. This is 
not what the Court contemplated and constitutes simple 
manipulation by the Plaintiff.2 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this case demands that the Court make a ruling 
regarding the Plaintiff's needs. Nothing in this case relieves 
the Court from that responsibility. In analyzing the income 
available to the receiving spouse, the Court should consider all 
As a matter of fact, that issue has been addressed by the trial court 
already and resolved, presumably, to the satisfaction of all the parties. 
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sources. The basis for ruling that the appreciation on otherwise 
separate property has been somehow commingled is erroneous. The 
Plaintiff should not be awarded fees for this appeal. 
The matter should be remanded to the trial court for 
adequate findings and with instructions to consider all sources 
of income available to the receiving spouse. The Defendant 
should be awarded his entire interest in his separate/inheritance 
property. 
DATED THIS l^ Q day of June, 1993. 
GREEN & BERRY 
FREDERICK N. GREEN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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